Nov 5, 2023. Posted by Balkan Periscope - Hellas
With the
end of the Nagorno-Karabakh entity and possibly a bloody series
of wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia’s foreign policy toward the
South Caucasus is undergoing fundamental shifts.
The fall of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave signifies a pivotal moment in Russia's diplomacy with the South Caucasus.
This shift is primarily highlighted by strained relations with its historical ally, Armenia, which did not receive anticipated support from Moscow during a series of confrontations with Azerbaijan since 2020.
The tensions have been
evident through a series of formal protests handed over to the Russian
ambassador in Armenia, criticism of the Russian government, and the inefficacy
of Moscow-led multilateral institutions such as the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
Russia has
traditionally maintained an equilibrium between Armenia and
Azerbaijan. Now, there seems to be a discernible tilt in Moscow’s position
towards Azerbaijan, influenced in part by Yerevan's rigid stance on peace talks
around Nagorno-Karabakh and partly by Putin's reservations about the
Armenian leadership. Additionally, geopolitics played its role: following the
Ukrainian conflict, Azerbaijan became a principal land conduit to Iran, aiming
to pivot Russia's foreign trade from west to east.
Although Russia may adapt its foreign policy in response to these power dynamics, this new era might not be entirely favorable for Moscow, suggesting its diminished power in the South Caucasus.
This waning influence, heightened by the Kremlin’s
distracting war effort in Ukraine, could be viewed as a clear sign of the
gradual diminution of Russian geopolitical clout in the region spanning
from the Black Sea to the borders of Central Asia and China.
In the South Caucasus, Russia is now facing a dense geopolitical environment, contending against the likes of the US, EU, Turkey, Iran, and, more recently, China.
This complex dynamic offers Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia more diplomatic flexibility. They can now joggle one actor against another, increasing the momentum behind the now-fashinable multi-vectoral foreign policy.
Highlighting these shifting dynamics, France recently agreed to enhance
Armenia's defense capabilities by signing military agreements, while Azerbaijan
and Iran consented to a new railway bypassing Armenia's southernmost region of
Syunik. These are just a few of the numerous other examples
signaling a shift from Russia-West competition toward more multi-aligned dynamics
in the South Caucasus.
Aware of
constraints on its influence, Russia began using a different set of
strategies toward the South Caucasus. Recognizing the historical influence of
Iran and Turkey in the region, Russia began openly supporting the 3+3 format,
which consists of three South Caucasus states and three big surrounding powers.
The recent summit held in Tehran on October 23 manifested Russia’s desire to
pursue this novel approach.
From
Moscow’s perspective, the 3+3 initiative is a logical
continuation of past initiatives. Over the past thirty years, several
initiatives have been proposed to boost regional cooperation in the South
Caucasus, such as the "Peaceful Caucasus Initiative" and the
"United Caucasus." The 3+3 concept originated after the
Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020. However, this format has its
sceptics, with countries like Georgia and Armenia harboring reservations due to
internal tensions among member nations.
Nonetheless,
post-the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenia might see the potential
benefit of participating, particularly given its growing ties with
Iran, which aims to curb Azerbaijan's regional aspirations and counterbalance
Turkish influence.
Many people in the West and in Georgia view the 3+3 initiative as yet another attempt by the South Caucasus' three dominant regional powers—Iran, Russia, and Turkey—to expand their influence.
Iran and Russia both support "regionalism" in the South Caucasus, putting emphasis on the idea that neighboring nations should be primarily responsible for addressing regional challenges.
Moreover, this sentiment was echoed in various statements made
by Baku, who seems increasingly frustrated by the Western mediation efforts and
is more reliant on the Moscow-led negotiating track.
However, there are even differences among the major powers. While Russia appears supportive, in the longer run it remains wary of the 3+3 initiative, fearing it could amplify Turkey's influence and elevate Iran's position in Armenia and the wider South Caucasus.
Grounds for discomfort are indeed there.
Iran has taken advantage of Russia's vulnerability as a result of the
conflict in Ukraine, while Russia is gradually but steadily depending on the
Islamic Republic for trade, transit, and the opportunity to get around Western
sanctions.
The problem for Moscow is that, at the present moment, it cannot deny these two Middle East powers from enjoying greater influence in the region. What many in the West miss is that Moscow feels far more comfortable with Ankara and Tehran than with the West.
Iran and Turkey are competing within acceptable boundaries, while the
West, from the Kremlin’s point of view, has crossed all red
lines.
For Russia, the only real chance to maintain its influence in the South Caucasus is through engaging the actors in the Middle East and denying the non-regional powers any tangible presence in the region.
Indeed, the Tehran meeting reiterates the intent of Turkey, Iran, and Russia to minimize Western influence in the region. To counter this, the EU and US should be more assertive in delineating their regional aspirations for the South Caucasus. Potential steps could include offering Georgia the coveted EU candidate status, reinforcing its pro-Western diplomatic posture, and positioning the EU to influence the broader South Caucasus.
Building closer ties with Armenia could
be another measure, especially given the state of bilateral relations
between Yerevan and Moscow.
Emil
Avdaliani is a professor at European University and the Director of Middle East
Studies at the Georgian think-tank, Geocase.
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